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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties to the proceedings are Plaintiff/Appellee Viking 
Insurance Company and Defendants/Appellants Trans Coastal 
Trucking and Allen Coleman. Defendants Rene Peterson and UDOT 
did not file an appeal and do not participate in these 
proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is appropriate 
under U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court properly ruled that the accident 
caused by Mr. Coleman's negligent crossing of a roadway did not 
arise out the use or maintenance of his insured vehicle as 
defined by the Viking automobile insurance policy. 
The standard of review of a trial court's order granting 
summary judgment interpreting an insurance policy is for 
correctness. AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Moran & Co., 860 P.2d 924 
(Utah 1993) . 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-303 is at issue in this case 
because its language regarding mandatory coverage for automobile 
liability policies is coextensive with the language of the Viking 
Insurance Company policy language at issue here. 
The statute in relevant part states: 
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of 
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Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle 
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) shall: 
(b)(i)if it is an owner's policy, designate by 
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which 
coverage is granted, insure the person named in the 
policy, insure any other person using any named motor 
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection 
(l)(c) against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
or use of these motor vehicles within the United States 
and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and 
costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than 
the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304 . 
UCA § 31A-22-303(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment to Plaintiff/Appellee Viking Insurance 
Company, ruling that as a matter of law Defendant/Appellant Allen 
Coleman's liability for the accident in question did not arise 
out of the use or maintenance of his Viking insured vehicle. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an automobile - pedestrian accident which 
occurred on State Road 201 (2100 South freeway) at approximately 
5600 West in Salt Lake County, Utah on January 7, 1994. Mr. 
Coleman was attempting to cross the roadway to return to his 
vehicle when he tripped on the uneven surface of the roadway and 
fell. An oncoming semi-tractor trailer, owned by Trans Coastal 
Trucking and driven by Rene Peterson, attempted to avoid hitting 
Mr. Coleman, swerved and rolled into the median causing injuries 
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to the driver and property damage. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Viking Insurance Company filed an action in declaratory 
relief pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-3-1 against Defendants Coleman, 
Peterson, Trans Coastal Trucking and UDOT. See R. 1. Viking 
requested the trial court declare that the accident did not arise 
out of the use or maintenance of Coleman's automobile which was 
insured by Viking at the time. See R. 4. 
After discovery, Viking filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting that the material facts giving rise to the accident 
were not in dispute making the interpretation of the Viking 
insurance contract an appropriate question of law. See R. 82. 
Trans Coastal filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary 
judgment. See R. 162. Coleman joined in Trans Coastal's motion 
on May 24, 1995 and Peterson joined in Trans Coastal motion on 
May 26, 1995. See R. 195, 198. 
Oral argument was held on August 1, 1995. At the hearing 
Judge Homer Wilkinson granted Viking's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the Defendants' motion. See R. 228. The 
trial court entered its order granting Viking's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing Defendants' counterclaims against 
Viking. See Appendix A, R. 238. This appeal follows by Coleman 
and Trans Coastal. Peterson and UDOT did not join in the appeal. 
3 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
The following facts were not disputed in the court below: 
1. Defendant, Allen K. Coleman, was a named insured under 
an automobile liability policy number 44 0005256, issued by 
Viking Insurance Company. See Appendix "A," R. 97. 
2. The policy was issued for a 1983 Oldsmobile Omega, VIN 
1G3AE69R7DW351369 owned by Mr. Coleman. See Id. 
3. The policy provides for coverage as follows: 
We promise to pay damages, within the limits of 
our policy, for bodily injury or property damage for 
which the law holds you responsible because of a car 
accident involving a car we insure. 
See, Appendix "A" (emphasis in original). 
4. A car accident is defined in the policy as, "an 
unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or 
property damage and arises out of the ownership, maintenance or 
use of a car or other motor vehicle." Appendix "A", at 2 
(emphasis added); cf. U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(1). 
5. On January 7, 1994, Defendant Coleman had been having 
mechanical trouble with his 1983 Oldsmobile Omega automobile. See 
R. 123, Deposition of Allen Coleman, p. 8. 
6. Mr. Coleman had experienced a carburetor fire earlier 
that day while on his way to work. See Id. 
1. Mr. Coleman attempted to drive the car from the point 
of the carburetor fire to his home in Magna, Utah in order to 
repair the vehicle. See R. 121. Mr. Coleman testified, "I got it 
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[the car] running to where I could get it back out to where my 
parents live, out in Magna where I was staying, and the car 
stopped again, just completely stopped at this point." See Id. 
8. Mr. Coleman pulled his disabled vehicle off the right 
side of the road on westbound State Road 201 near its 
intersection with 5600 West in Salt Lake City. See Id. 
9. Mr. Coleman diagnosed the problem as a defective 
thermostat and believed he could make the repairs himself without 
towing the vehicle from its place off the side of the road. Id. 
10. Mr. Coleman left his vehicle and traveled immediately 
south, crossing the westbound, two-lane roadway (his prior 
direction of travel). He then crossed the median, and then 
crossed the two eastbound lanes of the 2100 South freeway. See 
R. 123. 
11. Mr. Coleman climbed the fence which boarders the 
roadway and went to a nearby service station and telephoned an 
auto parts store, ordering a replacement part. See R. 122. 
12. Mr. Coleman then returned to his car by the same route 
to wait for delivery of the part. After approximately ninety 
minutes, the part had not been delivered. See R. 121. 
13. Mr. Coleman again left his vehicle, crossed the two 
lanes of westbound traffic, the median, the two lanes of 
eastbound traffic, climbed the fence and returned to the 
telephone to inquire regarding delivery of the part. He was 
informed that the part would be delivered immediately. See R. 
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121-122. 
14. Mr. Coleman then began to repeat the same route to 
return to his vehicle to wait for the delivery. Id. 
15. After climbing the fence, Mr. Coleman began traveling 
north, across the eastbound lanes of the 2100 South freeway when 
he tripped on the uneven surface of the roadway, landing on and 
injuring his ri - *t knee. See R. 125-126. 
16. Mr. Cuieman has a fused left knee and, as a result of 
injuring his right knee in the fall, he was unable to get up or 
otherwise move off of the roadway. See Exhibit R. 125. 
17. Defendant, Rene Peterson was driving a semi tractor-
trailer owned by Defendant Trans Coastal Trucking eastbound on 
State Road 201 at the time Coleman fell. See R. 128. 
18. When Mr. Peterson saw Mr. Coleman lying in the road, 
Mr. Peterson attempted to avoid colliding with Mr. Coleman and 
overturned the truck in the median causing injury and property 
damage. See R. 1-6, 45-53, 222-227. 
19. Mr. Coleman admitted in deposition that nothing about 
the car or anything related to the car caused him to fall. See 
R. 134. He also admits that his fall was caused by a combination 
of the uneven pavement and his fused knee which limited his 
mobility after the fall. See R. 137-38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Coleman's 
negligence (and resulting liability) did not arise out of the use 
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or maintenance of the Viking insured vehicle. While insurance 
contracts are construed liberally, they are limited by the 
intended purposes the specific type of insurance. Moreover, 
statutory coverage requirements in Utah are identical to the 
Viking policy language. Therefore, interpretation of the policy 
language also interprets the statute. Rules of statutory 
construction mandate that terms be given effect according to 
their plain meaning. 
The accident did not arise out of use or maintenance of the 
vehicle. Courts of every jurisdiction require a significant 
causal connection between an accident and an insured vehicle 
before liability coverage will be implicated. But for causation 
is insufficient to implicate insurance coverage because nothing 
relating to the vehicle is causally related to the accident. 
The accident in this case did not arise out of the use of 
the vehicle because Mr. Coleman was not using the vehicle as a 
vehicle, or for any purpose inherent in its nature as a vehicle, 
at the time. Mr. Coleman was removed from the insured vehicle in 
time, space, activity, focus and purpose when he fell. 
Similarly, Mr. Coleman was not maintaining the vehicle at the 
time he fell. He was not engaged in any activity causally 
connected with the act of maintaining a vehicle when he fell. 
The trial court properly ruled that the accident in question 
did not arise out of the use or maintenance of the insured 
vehicle. Summary judgment may be affirmed in favor of Viking. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN UTAH ARE TO BE INTERPRETED LIBERALLY 
TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF INSURANCE. 
The Viking automobile policy specifically provides for 
payment for damages arising out of "a car accident involving a 
car we insure." See Exhibit "1". A "car accident" is defined in 
the policy as, "an unexpected and unintended event that causes 
bodily injury or property damage and arises out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a car or other motor vehicle." Appendix 
"A", at p.2 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Annotated § 31A-
22-303(1) . 
According to the Supreme Court, "[g]enerally the 
interpretation of insurance policy language presents a question 
of law to be decided by the trial judge using accepted methods of 
construction." Nielson v. O'Reilly. 84 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 
1992). Insurance policies are to be liberally interpreted to 
"promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance". U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993). 
Liberal interpretation of insurance contracts is, however, 
tempered by the reasonable limitations imposed by the "commonly 
understood meaning" of a policy's terms. Cf.. P.E. Ashton Co. v. 
Jovner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965). 
The policy at issue in this case is an automobile liability 
policy. The "purpose" of such insurance is statutorily 
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e s t a b l i s h e d , Utah law express ly requires an insurer to provide 
l i a b i l i t y insurance for damages "arising out of" the "ownership, 
maintenance or use of a vehic le" in a l l automobile l i a b i l i t y 
p o l i c i e s i ssued in the s t a t e . See U.C.A. § 31A-22-303(1). 
The s tatutory language in Utah i s substant ive ly i d e n t i c a l t o 
the language of the Viking p o l i c y . Therefore, t h i s Court's 
in terpre ta t ion of the relevant provis ions of the Viking po l i cy 
w i l l a l s o e s t a b l i s h t h i s S t a t e ' s in terpretat ion of U.C.A. § 31A-
22-303(1) . In def ining the relevant terms at i s sue in t h i s case , 
p r i n c i p l e s of s tatutory construct ion apply.1 By i t s express 
s ta tutory purpose, automobile l i a b i l i t y insurance i s not intended 
to provide general l i a b i l i t y coverage for a person's negl igence . 
Id. 
Utah courts have not decided any cases def ining or 
addressing whether the conduct of a driver "arises out of" the 
"ownership, maintenance or use" of a veh i c l e under e i ther the 
s t a t u t e or s p e c i f i c insurance po l icy language. Therefore, t h i s 
Court's in terpre ta t ion of the "plain language" of U.C.A. § 31A-
The Supreme Court has instructed, Hthe primary rule of statutory 
interpretat ion i s to give e f f e c t to the intent of the l e g i s l a t u r e in l i g h t of the 
purpose the s ta tute was meant to achieve." Sull ivan v . Scoular Grain Co,, 853 
P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993). The Court continued, - to discover that in tent , we 
look f i r s t t o the p la in language of the s t a t u t e . " Harmon City v. Nielsen & 
Senior, Adv. Rep. (Utah 1995) ( c i t ing State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 
1357 (Utah 1993)) . In defining statutory terms the Court s ta ted , "we assume that 
'each term in the statue i s used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
l i t e r a l l y unless such a reading i s unreasonably confused or inoperable." Johnson 
v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County, 277 Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995) ( c i t i n g 
Savage Industr ies , Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 
1991)) . 
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22-303(i) will a fortiori define the "liberal reading" of the 
Viking policy. 
II. 
THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF COLEMAN'S USE 
OF THE VIKING INSURED VEHICLE. 
The issue in this case is whether Mr. Coleman's actions 
arose out of the use or maintenance of the Viking insured 
vehicle. The District Court properly ruled the accident did not 
arise out of the use of the insured vehicle based on the 
undisputed facts. See Nielsen, at 665. 
The following arguments will affirm that the trial court 
correctly ruled that the accident in this case did not "arise out 
of" the "use" or "maintenance" of the Viking insured vehicle as a 
matter of law. The decision of the trial court may be affirmed. 
A. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DO NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE 
ACCIDENT "ARISE OUT OF" USE OR MAINTENANCE OF THE VEHICLE. 
The initial question to be resolved is whether the accident 
in question is one which arises out of the use of the insured 
vehicle. This issue is essentially a determination of the 
causation necessary to implicate insurance coverage under Utah 
law and the language of the policy. 
While Utah courts have not defined the terms "arising out 
of" in the context of an automobile policy, the term has been 
touched upon in the context of a homeowner's liability policy in 
National Farmers Union Property & Cas* Co. v. Western Casualty & 
Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978). The Supreme Court in 
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National Farmers Union recognized that the term arising out of in 
the automobile insurance context "imports a concept of causat ion; 
there must be a causal nexus between an accident or injury in the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the v e h i c l e . " National Farmers 
Union, at 963 (quoting Vanguard Ins . v . Cantre l l , 503 P.2d 962 
(Ariz. App. 1973)) (emphasis added). 
S imi lar ly , the Florida Court of Appeals in Government 
Employees Ins . Co. v . Batchelder 421 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. App. Dl 
1982)2 spec i f i ed that the causation element requires something 
l e s s than proximate cause but s u f f i c i e n t causation to c o n s t i t u t e 
a "nexus" or "connection" to the v e h i c l e . In Colorado3 the 
Supreme Court explained the necessary causal re la t ionsh ip 
s t a t i n g , "the causation t e s t does not require that the insured 
v e h i c l e i t s e l f be the cause of the injury, only that the use be 
i n t e g r a l l y re la ted to the c la imant's a c t i v i t i e s and the injury at 
the time of the acc ident ." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v . 
McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 103 (Colo. 1995). 
The Colorado Supreme Court noted, "[t]he reason for t h i s 
causal requirement i s t o ensure that there i s some nexus between 
2
 For an injury to f a l l within the "use" coverage of an automobile pol icy 
in Florida H ( l ) the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the 
automobile, as such; (2) the accident must have arisen within the natural 
t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s of an automobile, and the actual use must not have terminated? 
(3) the automobile must not merely contribute to cause the condition which 
produces the injury, but must i t s e l f produce the injury." Batchelder, at 61 . 
3
 The language of the Colorado s tatute i s nearly ident i ca l to that in 
Utah requiring p o l i c i e s to "insure every [insured] person on account of the 
maintenance, use or operation of the motor vehic le" . Section 42-7-413 C.R.S. 
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the vehicle's use and the injury. The nexus guarantees that the 
accident is within the kind of risks that the automobile 
insurance was meant to cover." McMichael, at 103. The court 
further stated that the causation requirement helps distinguish 
"between 'injuries that are related to the use of an automobile, 
and injuries that are related to an automobile only because they 
coincidentally occurred in the vehicle.'" McMichael, (quoting 
Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1986)). 
In Kolkin v. American Family Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 538, 540 
(Minn.App. 1984) the Minnesota test for causation is set forth in 
a four part test: 
1) there must be some "causal connection" between the 
injury and the use of the vehicle for transportation 
purposes, Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d 
116 (Minn. 1981); 
2) this "causal connection" is less than proximate 
cause but more than the vehicle being the "mere situs" 
of the injury; Id.; 
3) the requisite connection exists of the injury is a 
"natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the 
use of the vehicle," Id.; and 
4) the vehicle must be an "active accessory" to the 
injury sustained. Holm v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. 
Co., 261 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1977). 
Idaho courts specify that the "arising out of" language of a 
policy requires more than "but for" causation. Hawkeye-Security 
Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 866 P.2d 976, 982 (Idaho App. 1994). 
The court explained there must be some "substantial nexus between 
the use of the vehicle and the injury." Hawkeye-Security, at 980 
(citing 6B Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4316 (1979)). In 
their opening brief, Appellants suggest that the Supreme Court's 
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interpretation of arising out of in the National Farmers Union, 
case encompasses any event which can be connected to an accident 
by a potentially endless chain of fortuitous but-for 
relationships. See Appellant's brief pp. 9-10. 
Other courts have expressly and implicitly rejected the 
gossamer thread of but for causation Appellants suggest. In 
Hawkeye-Security the court flatly stated it "is not enough to say 
that 'but for' the use of the automobile, the injury would not 
have occurred." Hawkeye-Security. at 980. The court then cited 
numerous cases which eschew the but for analysis and require a 
more substantial causal connection between the use of the 
automobile and the injury or accident. See Hawkeye-Security, at 
980-981(and authority cited therein). The court stated, "a 
contrary view, if carried to its logical conclusion, would 
'attach automobile insurance to every accident which occurred 
after an insured had first been transported by an automobile.'" 
Hawkeye, at 982 (citing Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Safeco 
Insurance Co., 163 Cal. Rptr. 219, 223 (Cal. App. 1983)). 
The court in Hawkeye-Security cited its prior opinion in 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 691 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 
App. 1984), stating: 
The policy provisions requiring the injury to "arise 
out of the use" of the vehicle connotes a causal relation 
between the injury and the use. The causal connection must 
be more than incidental or fortuitous. 
Smith, 691 P.2d at 1290 (emphasis added). 
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This Utah Supreme Court's dicta in National Farmers Union, 
recognizing a "causal nexus" must exist is consistent with the 
causation requirements expressed in other jurisdictions and as 
explained in Hawkeye-Security. Appellants' claim that arising 
out of language can be fairly read to encompass but for causation 
is also erroneous on other levels as well. 
Initially, Appellants' espousal of but for causation is 
inconsistent with a significant line of cases which find 
causation lacking where the vehicle is the "mere situs" of the 
accident. Other jurisdictions generally recognize the mere fact 
that an automobile is the place where an injury occurs does not, 
itself, implicate automobile liability insurance coverage. See 
Criterion v. Velthouse, 751 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986); see also Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrick, 819 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Kan. 1991) 
(intentional sexual assault in an insured vehicle does not arise 
out of use of vehicle to trigger liability coverage); State Farm 
Auto Ins. Co v. Nol, 699 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tenn. 1993) (two police 
officers shot in their patrol vehicle by stranded driver who was 
given a ride was not an accident arising out of the use of the 
vehicle). Assuming only but for causation is required, each of 
these cited cases would have triggered coverage because a but for 
connection can be made to the insured vehicle. 
On the issue of mere incidental relation to the vehicle, the 
court in Stuckv v. Long. 783 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1989) held: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
14 
(using Minnesota law) the accident must be a natural and 
reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the motor 
vehicle* The fact that the automobile was used preceding the 
accident does not establish a sufficient causal connection. 
Stucky, at 503 (citing Gilbertson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 845 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added). 
The inapplicability of tenuous, but for causation is further 
demonstrated by the fact that many cases hold that physical 
proximity to the vehicle alone is not enough to trigger coverage. 
Chamblee v. State Farm, 601 S.2d 922, 923 (Ala. 1992) (coverage 
not implicated where child exited vehicle, crossed street to 
median and then was struck by car while crossing street); Pope v. 
Stolts, 712 S.W. 2d 434, 436 (Mo. 1986) (injury to plaintiff 
while leaning over open hood of first vehicle while second 
vehicle was immediately adjacent and assisting to jump start 
first vehicle was not accident arising out of the use of the 
second vehicle); Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Logan, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (N.Y. 1982) (slip and fall in icy parking lot 
while returning to insured car did not arise out of use of 
vehicle and did not arise from the intrinsic nature of the 
vehicle). 
Appellants' claim of but for causation is further defeated 
by cases which recognize that the causation may be broken by acts 
of independent significance. The court in Stucky recognized, 
"[tjhe causal connection can be severed by any intervening act of 
independent significance." Stucky, at 503 (citing Gilbertson v. 
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State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins, Co., 845 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
In Stucky an uninsured driver attempted to assault the insured 
while he and the insured were each driving their own vehicles. 
The two vehicles later stopped and the drivers exited their 
respective cars. The insured was then assaulted by the driver of 
the uninsured vehicle. The insured made a claim on his own 
uninsured motorist policy asserting his injuries arose out of the 
assailant's use of an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by his 
own automobile insurance policy. 
The court ruled that uninsured motorist coverage did not 
apply because the assault was not causally connected to the 
uninsured vehicle. The court also rejected the insured's 
argument that but for the prior use of the uninsured vehicle he 
would not have been in the place he was attacked. The court said 
such causation was too remote. The court concluded: 
Although it can be argued that (the insured) would not have 
been in the that place at that time if (the uninsured 
driver) had not tried to run him off the roadf the injuries 
(the insured) received did not arise out of the use of (the 
uninsured driver's) automobile. There was no causal 
connection between the uninsured motor vehicle and (the 
insured's injuries). As in Race v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
supra, the injuries occurred only after the parties had left 
their automobiles. The causal connection required for 
uninsured motorist coverage may not be a remote cause." 
Stucky, at 505. 
Consistently, in Hawkeye-Security, the court citing Holm v. 
Mutual Service Casualty Co., 261 N.W. 2d 598, 603 (Minn. 1977) 
concluded that in numerous cases, "the acts of leaving a vehicle 
16 
and inflicting a battery were viewed as events if i ndependent 
significance which broke the causal link between the "use" of the 
i HI? hi 11 In ji in in ill I li i l l in i l l i t " fa i n l I j i i J l e i l a w k e ' Y e-Securi Ii \ a, Il: 980 
( emphas i s addi i I I 
In a c a s e a n a l o g o u s t o t h e p i e s e n t m a t t e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t 
11 II i\ I i l l i i i i i in mi I mi in i i I III II II in i in III mi I mi I n 1 mi in 11 in i mi mi i l Il  b i i 1 »•' I y i i III I, e r 
leaving an insured vehicle constitutes an independent 
undertaking, - nfficiont to never the causal nexus. In the case 
111 Lhdiublee v. State ibaiiii M u L Auto. Ins. Co. , 1111 11 S ::::>. 2 ii 11 2 J 3 
(Ala, 1992 1 the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that coverage did not 
extend tn incidents where a "new activity had begun" after 
ex.11 I in] "eliiclt-." « Jjl « iJ t HJ 4 
In Chamblee a c h i l d and he r aun t had t r a v e l e d t o a s p o r t i n g 
even t in H I P mint si r a r , The two a l i g h t e d from th~ " e h i o l e na 
[ J i u c e tj i J i • 111 I I I s d I e I \ i i II 11 a . I I  d i e t 1 1 I 11 I 1111' in 11 m Il i, a 11 , 
MM c h i l d t h e . i a r t e d nut i n t o t h e s t r e e t and was s t r uc K DV 
oncoming n r The c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e r h a i n nf e v e n t s 
y iv i in j I i. i.i ,' I  c c i d e n t w e i e s e t in i i m l j n t i i HI I y c: t h e 
c h i l d "had comple t ed t h e a c t of e x i t i n g l I I |i t r u c k " and r e a c h i n g 
t. p - : r . - Gf s a f e t y . I d . The c h i l d ' s new and I n d e p e n d e n t a c t of 
c n l i M m 1  i i 1 ii III ii I i II II i i II mi i l l i II u i I } 
disassociated from the already completed use of the aunt's 
vehicJ e. I d at M M , Similarly, in I he casn of Carter v, City , 
P ar i s h Cover nmen t, "II 11 1 ,!J« O . -.1 i.l I "III',» ( I „.JI | | Ill"' l" III I | t h e c o u r t f o u n d 
that a passenger's act of leaving the insured vehicle when the 
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vehicle stalled in floodwatersf broke the causal nexus between 
the vehicle's use and the passenger's subsequent, accidental 
drowning. 
In Dohman v. Housely, 478 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. App. 1991) the 
court ruled that injuries incurred by a police officer who was 
struck by a vehicle after leaving his police car to approach a 
third vehicle for purposes of investigation did not arise out of 
the "use" of the patrol car* The court ruled that the patrol car 
was not the active accessory nor in anyway causally related to 
his injury. 
Similarly, a policeman who was injured when he was chasing a 
suspect on foot after stopping his car was not entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage. The court ruled that the uninsured 
car the suspect had been traveling in prior to the foot pursuit 
was not the injury causing instrumentality of the officer's 
injury. Carter v. Burns, 630 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio App. 1993). 
In sum, the causation required is more than but for 
causation but less than legal, proximate cause. There must be 
some causal relationship between the accident and the use or 
maintenance of the vehicle. That causal relationship must not be 
merely fortuitous or incidental. The relationship may not be 
terminated or broken by acts of independent significance or new 
undertakings. 
The specific facts of the present case demonstrate that Mr. 
Coleman's vehicle was not causally related to the accident. Mr. 
18 
Coleman's negligent attempt to cross a busy roadway while 
returning to hi s veh i cle was the occurrence wh i ch set the 
sequence of events in tc mo tic n causii lg the a ::c:i dei i t Cjf. . ,.- • .;• 
Chamblee, at 92 i To go back to the period of ti me Mr. Coleman 
was I ist * *:.he vehi cl e extends the causal r e] ati onsh ip of t he 
ven. . te accident beyc i i :i the br e 'ak i ng i; oi n t TI: le • > ' e h i » " I f 
at best, was only incidental! y related to the accident. Mr. 
(7~^-~r~ v- : i nt actually usinq the vehicle at the time, nor was 
Mr. ww^eman in i:lose physical proximity In I I hiclt, Mi 
Coleman's act of crossing the busy highway was an act of 
independent significance,, break i ng the cha i n of causati on, c f . 
Id • Mr. Coleman had been in a pJ ace c f safe t;j c ff c f the road • 
He could 1: 1a \ e easily (and properly) returned to h Is vehicle 
without I Illegally crossing the highway. His neg] i gent act of 
attempting to cross the freeway was the cause of the accident. 
His subjective intent to return, to the vehicle for whatever 
purpose i s I rrel evant to the zausat i on i nqu :a ry • See Thomas » 
Trave l e r s I n s , , 38 3 ' N, 1 S 2c 1 193 19 ! ( I 'I! ill Hi! j { Ill 9 76 ) 
No causal relationship has been established between the 
accident and the veh iil cle based on the und I spi ited facts, 
Therefore, the* trial court was correct :i i:i i: m l ing that ! Ir, 
coleman/s negligence did not arise out of the use of the Viking 
insured vehicle as a matte i: c f 3 aw • The tr ial court's ruling 
that the Viking policj does not cover this event was proper and 
may be affinne I 
B. THE ACCIDENT DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE USE OF THE INSURED 
AUTOMOBILE. 
The second aspect of the issue before this Court is whether 
Mr. Coleman's activities at the time of the accident, if causally 
connected to the vehicle, constituted use of the insured vehicle 
within the plain meaning of that word. The undisputed facts show 
that at the time of the accident Mr. Coleman was walking across a 
street when he tripped and fell on the uneven roadway. 
The court in McMichael begun its analysis by stating, "when 
determining the meaning of the term use in an automobile 
insurance policy, a court must look to the factual circumstances 
in each case, including the particular characteristics of the 
vehicle and the intention of the parties to the insurance 
contract." McMichael, at 102. Courts generally begin the 
analysis of the use of a vehicle by examining whether the vehicle 
was being used as a vehicle. In other words, the use of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident must be consistent with the 
vehicle's inherent nature and purpose; in this case, 
transportation. In McMichael, the court defined the issue before 
it as whether the insured was "using an insured vehicle in a 
manner that was not foreign to its inherent purpose at the time 
of the accident." McMichael, at 101 (emphasis added).4 
4
 The dissent in McMichael, also agreed that the use of the vehicle 
must be inherent to its nature. The dissent stated, "The burden on the claimant 
to establish that he was not using the vehicle in a manner foreign to its 
inherent purpose.'* McMichael at 108 (dissent) (citing Chung La v. State Farm 
Auto. Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1010-1011 (Colo. 1992)). 
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The court I n Hawkeye-Security, began its inquiry cf this 
issue by stati 1:1 :j " 1 i abi 1 1 ty i nsurance coverage wi 1 ] ^e afforded 
i n tl: le present case on] j :i f t:l: :i s • [ ] :i 1 lji :i i: } i * a „ 3 cai is a] • - i 
to (the insured's) use of the automobile and that use of the 
vehicle was related
 m t o_ the inherent nature of the automobile," 
Hawkeye-Securit \ r , at 9 3 9 (emphasi s added) The c 011 11: t lit n Haw keye-
Security, further stated that the injury must be shown to arise 
from, the "inherent nature of the automobi ] e i n order to bri ng it 
within the terms of the 'i lse ' cl a;i ise, " Hawkeye-Secui ity a 1: 979 . 
In Florida the first prong of the four par t test requires 
that "the accident must hav e ari sen out of the i nherent ~ar-*re 
of the automobile, as such," Government Employees Insurance ^u, 
v. Batchelder, 421 So, 2d 59 (Fla.App 1)1! 1982) (emphasis added). 
I11 McMichael , the court cone] uded 1 
In the present case, McMichael's accident was integrally 
related to his work on the road, where it was expected that 
he would be put in danger from, other motorists. For this 
reason, the truck was equipped with protective gear and 
warnings devices and was positioned to provide a barrier. 
Thus at the time of the accident, McMichael was using the 
truck for protection, the truck was not merely the physical 
location where the accident occurred. 
McMichael, at ] 04 In contrast to the facts of the present ^ .=, ^, 
purpose (a warning and safety barrier) while the insured was out 
of the vehicle working on the road. In the present case, the 
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Viking insured vehicle did not continue to serve its inherent 
purpose (transportation) once Mr. Coleman left the area. 
Moreover, an ordinary motorist does not ordinarily use a vehicle 
in the manner that the plaintiff in McMichael did. 
The court in McMichael then went on to focus on other cases 
dealing with the inherent nature of automobiles having 
specialized or peculiar uses or equipment. For example, the 
court cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia which 
ruled that a fire fighter injured while filling out a report 25 
feet from his fire truck was using his fire truck at the time 
because "use of the fire truck to extinguish the fire, control 
traffic and protect fire fighters including (the plaintiff), was 
an integral part of the fire fighters' mission." Great American 
Insurance Co. v. Cassell, 389 S.E.2d 476, 477 (Va. 1990). 
However, that same supreme court has previously ruled that a 
police officer who was injured after he exited his vehicle to 
serve a subpoena was not using his vehicle at the time of the 
injury. Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry,134 S.E.2d 418, 
421 (Va. 1964). The court ruled that at the time of the injury 
the officer was not using the vehicle as a vehicle. Instead, the 
officer had ceased using the vehicle for any specialized purpose 
prior to the time of the accident. Id. 
The Cassell case and similar decisions illustrate that it is 
essential that the vehicle itself continues to be used as a 
vehicle when the accident occurs. See e.g. Monroe Guar.Ins. Co. 
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i , Lampufa , n nn mi mi in • n 11 n r r fi r ^  f T i r i r \\\ i f i «i «i i ) ( i , IM r 1 m i i-
I MI rator Injured while walkiny tiuiit police vehicle tu tow t m c k 
was engaged in activity essential to the towing process at time 
I * ' i < ic» 111 I Uberkiamei i,._. Kulxaneo lim, Lu • , 11' 111 ' W " i I 11111 
302- i CI J (Mo.Ct.App. Ill'INI) (police officer iri]uied while using his 
police car as a road block, part of the patrol car s specific 
f n u n I ' l l i i i l l , w i HI mi i i i I i III mi i I i - |i • ' • •'" '•' 
By contra I the Perry case and similar cases i llustrate 
that an injury resulting after leaving a vehicle does not arise 
i i mi 1 i I in 1 in in i in II 1 II in I i II in II i I  Il I) I in in 111 i * 11 in in I in in in in mi 
function integrally related to the activities of tl le Individual• 
Hi ''i»hicle must continue to be Integrally related to the 
a c t i ^ II I I H I 11 II I Ii mi in i i i mi i ill iii II II II 11 up pa i i l n i l I i I mi t l i Ei ii: Ii ii : z l • iiiiiii as ' ; - •' 
Il I ds being pail. u( that paitlcular vehicle's i nherent purpose. 
I n M i M i c h c t e i , I II n i l I ii I HI 11 Mi mi i ill i in I l i n n III 
the proximity of the claimant to the vehicle at the Lime <*t I.he 
accident but, rather arises out of the particular activity in 
wl :i :i ::  I: i t l : m i II .in i mi i l l t n y a y p i l I k J l i c h a e l I II 11 ' II III i s 
analysis Is like the third prong of the four pr ong analysis I n 
Washington which regu ires that the Insured be "vehicle oriented 
r a i II i ( i II, 111111 II i II 11 II i i/11 | II , i i de w a J k • ::)i: : s ' • Cheiry 
b
 The test in, Washington is: (1) there must be a causal relation or 
connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle; (2) the person 
asserting coverage must be in reasonably close geographic proximity to the 
insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it; (3) the 
23 
v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 892 P.2d 768, 770 (Wash. App. 1995). 
In Thomas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Ny.App. 
1976) held that injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was en 
route to his car but who was not within or actually entering his 
vehicle when struck by another vehicle did note arise out of the 
use of the vehicle. The court reasoned that at the time of the 
accident the insured was acting as a pedestrian rather than 
engaging in ownership, use or maintenance of his vehicle. Cf. 
Cherry, supra at n.6, factor 3. The court further stated that the 
insured's future intent to enter and we the vehicle was not 
relevant to the analysis. Thomas, at 499. 
In Hawkeye-Security the court further distinguished that the 
use of an ordinary vehicle for an unusual purpose does not 
trigger coverage. The court held that an ordinary motorist's use 
of a vehicle in a manner not inherent to its ordinary purpose was 
not a use of the vehicle reasonably related to the car's inherent 
nature under the policy. The driver in Hawkeye-Securitv used his 
vehicle to block the road. The court, distinguishing other 
cases, found that such a use was not inherent to the nature of 
regular passenger vehicles stating: 
When Gilbert parked his car in a position to narrow the 
area available for Laragan's passage and exited the 
vehicle to confront Laragan, he abandoned his role as a 
motorist and also abandoned any use of the car 
person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the 
time; and (4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the 
use of the vehicle at the time. Cherry, at 770. 
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reasonably related to its Inherent nature as a vehicle. 
H aw keye-Securit y 11 "' l" 11 II 
In this case Mi . Coleman was not using his vehicle as a 
vehicle at the time of the accident. Mr. Coleman's vehicle was 
mi i I I I I J L Il in in mi I i i d l ' i i i i ' i e q i i i i piiiipnil i n I u n c i i n n II l i i p r e f n n - , 
:i . I not and LOiuJd mil continue to use the vehicle ailui 
abandoning it at the side of the road unlike the parties in 
McMichael .-i11 -.1 C11(Bri^ y \ 1 111 i 11 i« I I 11i". I IIIi i i ehic 1 es i n 1":heir 
activities. Mr. Coleman's vehicle had, therefore, ceased SCJ v m g 
its essential function of transportation well prior to the time 
i ' ( ' n i l i i i «i I "i i f Tnri i m i i < i f i P ^ 8 C I 
butf lather, bui'. ;i oadway oriented at the tine of the accident. 
See Cherryf supra at n. 6, factor 3. 
Ill II I ! C C II d l C i L j l J I 1.11 II l i I I I ! Il II II II II II I ' I I Ill W i l l II l " I I I II III I I I II l l l i l HI 111 
was performing after leaving the vehicle served to cuiitiiiue as 
part of the inherent function and purpose of the vehicle. It was 
m "nt II ei ri i i i i mi mi ,iLii i "I II i i ' I i i i l l mi in i i mi 11 mi i i i II 1 1 r i I M I I P I H I III" i • 111 j nt* he r 
foreseeable, continuing use. therefore, the accident did i 
arise out of any use of the vehicle as a matter of law, 
T H B A C T S Q F m^ C Q L B M M | m Mm MllSE ^JT QF THE MAINTENANCE 
OF THE INSURED VEHICLE, 
III I, II III i II in n i l II in II ii« 111 II i i 11 I II i iiii I Hi i l i n v t i ii II in II in mi II b e 
determined whether the actions ol Mi. Coleman arose out ol the 
inherent nature of the maintenance of his automobile In this 
case Hawkeye il H1! Hawkeyu \ ih'il lun i i »" IIII wliiii Ii 
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"normal maintenance and repairs" were inherent in the use of a 
vehicle. See Eichelberqer v. Rice, 434 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1981) 
(putting gas into a vehicle when injury occurred); Automobile 
Association v. United States Fire Ins. Co., Ill Cal. Rptr. 595 
(1974) (starting car while gas was being poured into the 
carburetor when injury occurred)). Unlike the present case, 
these cited cases involve direct interaction with the vehicle 
when the accidents occurred. In this case there is no connection 
between walking across a street and acts inherent in maintaining 
a vehicle such as putting gas in it, opening the hood, lying 
underneath it, changing a tire, etc. Mr. Coleman admitted that 
the vehicle did not cause him to fall. See Exhibit "2", at 21. 
Therefore, the injury did not involve maintenance of the vehicle. 
Hawkeye-Security, also rejects the Defendants' position on 
several levels. First, the activity of walking across a street 
is not remotely connected to the inherent tasks of maintaining a 
vehicle contemplated by the parties in procuring or offering 
automobile liability insurance. Mr. Coleman was not in or at the 
vehicle effecting repairs to the vehicle when the injury occurred 
as in the Appellants' cited cases. 
Mr. Coleman was also engaging in activities distant in both 
time and scope from the vehicle itself. Further, the independent 
act of leaving the vehicle and arriving at a point of safety 
breaks the chain of causation. See Hawkeye-Securitv, at 980. 
Third, the presence of the vehicle is merely incidental and 
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fortuitous rather tha n a causally related to maintenance of the 
v #key e-SecuriLy uxpresa I y m n < 1; . Illiiii > I n.m 
tenuous but for argument as inapplicable Lo I.he inquiry of 
whether an action arises out of the maintenance of a vehicle. 
T"l: le 1 a; :::::] ::: • ::: i: a ::iai isa Il 11111Jt' 1 11 H I I 11 I l i t - 1 in i i m l I J I I « I I I I I C . 
vehicle in the present case is illustrated hy a simple variacion 
of the present facts ' IJIIIMP !hii1" Mr. Coleman needed i  
bal l L e i > I n i hi in is ' . I J di inJed n,:a,i Aiabiuiie l u j u ti\ i/ibl j I n 11 m nil i 
auto parts store near the roadway. Further assume that Mr. 
Coleman found and selected a battery in the store and while 
W e l l k ,1 III 111 I I I III III I- Il III III III I Ill 1 1 Ill ; II I I I 1,1,11 III, 1 Ill Ill » Ill 1 111 III III II Ill I I I ' III ; 
customer in the store and dropped the battery on the customer's 
foot causing serious injury, Under Defendants' broad definition 
o l W iH / / / - e / i d /M . ' e , M M ni'i r n J e n l w i i l l i l l imp I i i l i e I In 1 I I I I U I I I U 
policy because Mr. Coleman was, in fad:, maintaining his vehicle 
at the time. Certain I > hut for the need to maintain the vehicle 
b y JJl l i t . C I I d , fa U K ] ml II 11 I I Il i Ill Ill II I, II 
no accident would have occurred. 
The example illustrates that there is no causa -^'l %+ ionship 
b e t w e e n I In i i iet j I, i,i:|itiiiil[ «-1 < i I L U I I I tin i i p p L i n . | d II, ill, I, H I \ 
foot and maintaining the vehicle. As in the example-. . n "cm-
present situati on, the causa ] 1 i nk i s broken by Mr'. Co] eman 
negligent act of illegally crossing a highway was the action, upon 
which neqliqence is asserted against Mr. Coleman rather than any 
act arising from the manner in which he maintained the vehicle. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that as a matter of 
law, Mr. Coleman's negligent crossing of the highway is not 
causally related to any use, or maintenance of an insured vehicle 
under the policy. As a result, Plaintiff is under no obligation 
to provide liability coverage for Mr. Coleman's independent acts 
of negligence. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S CITED CASES ARE NOT ON POINT AND READILY 
DISTINGUISHABLE. 
Defendant cites the case of Eichelberaer v. Rice, 434 A.2d 
747 (Pa. 1981), as being directly on point. The case is readily 
distinguishable on its facts.6 In Eichelberaer, the accident 
took place at the insured vehicle when a passenger stepped back 
from the vehicle. Id. at 750. The parties in Eichelberaer were 
in the very act of maintaining the vehicle by putting gas into 
the tank when the accident occurred. Id. at 750. In the present 
case the accident took place across the highway from where the 
vehicle was parked. In the present case no one was at the car in 
the very act of maintaining it. These facts alone are sufficient 
to distinguish the case. 
Furthermore, in Eichelberaer, the court's definition of 
"maintenance" tends to defeat Mr. Coleman's position in this 
6
 As pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, the resolution of the 
inquiry in these cases is highly fact specific, see McMichael at 102. 
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case In Eichelberaer, the court defined "maintenance" as "-11 
acts whi ch come withi n the ordinary scope and meaning of the 
wor :I ' ' I d a I: ' I '50 (emphasj s added) I I: i s a ::: t: :i :: i: 1 • :: f i: e :l 
car plainly comes within the definition of maintenance. However, 
the action, of crossi ng a street does not* Eichelberaer fails to 
finding that Mr. Coleman was maintaining his vehicle at the time 
of the accident. 
1 1: le :: ase • :: i: Na bioi lwide Mu bual 11 is . Co. i Da u i s , 4"" i' i ' i . Il " 11 
892 (NC.Ct .App. 1995 ) :i s a lso d I stinguishable. The Plaintiff in 
Davis was injured when she a lighted from a v eh i cl e and was struck 
the causal link was established because Ms. Davis parked the van 
in snnh a way that the plaintiff had to cross a roadway to reach 
t h e li<'i die si . J, n a l LOLI. Ua\ i b "i I HI" 
The Davis case is distinguished by the cogent analysis i n 
Chamblee where the court properly draws the causal ,1 i ne when, a 
par L j II, i•»id\ i-. I II e 1 n,i t • I a .111 I i e a i "lies a, poi n I: of s a,f e t:,,y, C h a m b l e e 
a ! "in J11!11] in Davis
 f the placement of the vehi cle i eguired the 
passenger to cross the street and she was struck immediately, 
fence, cross the street was for convenience, so he wouldn't have 
to wa] k i t, the next exi t off tl: i,e highway Coleman' s decision was 
party in Davis who had to cross the roadway to join her 
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grandmother. Davis, at 895; C£. Chamblee at 924. 
Defendants also cite Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 386 
N.W.2d 299 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) as supportive. That case is 
distinguished by its facts as well as the holding of Logan, 451 
N.Y.S.2d at 805. The vehicle at issue in Barry was still the 
focus of the insured's activity at the time of the accident. The 
act of walking was the focus of the party's activity in Logan. 
In this case the focus of Coleman's activity at the time was 
walking and traversing the street rather than on the use or 
maintenance of the vehicle, making Logan applicable. Mr. 
Coleman's actions were not activities related to the use of the 
vehicle as a vehicle as in Barry, making Barry inapplicable. 
Finally the case of Kolkin v. American Family Ins. Co., 347 
N.W.2d 538 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) which Appellants cite is not 
supportive of their position. In that case the accident occurred 
while an inoperable vehicle was abandoned and yet/ was still left 
in the roadway. The court stated/ "a vehicle obstructing a 
roadway is not, however, spassive' in terms of legal causation/ 
unlike a tree or a stone or other object alongside the roadway, 
particularly in the hours of darkness without proper warning 
lights, makes such a vehicle an vactive accessory' to a 
collision." JEd. at 534. The vehicle in Kolkin was still located 
in a place inherent to its traveling function; the roadway. The 
court agreed that coverage applied stating, "the 'use' of the 
vehicle had not ended when it was left obstructing the road." 
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Kolkin, at 540. 
In Mi present rase unlike Kolkin , the vehicle was not =in 
"active accessory" in I he accident and its IMP lii.nl n uded pi 
the accidenl • Appellants' cited cases do not support their 
pMqii i i ppp*ii I'll-" r MI i ] 1 in r»t r t^-1- th-'t Mr, Cnleman was 
neither using tun maintaininy hio vehicle at the linit u.t I he 
accident. Therefore,- there is no causal connection between Mr. 
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p l i c a t e l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e . -
CONCLUSION 
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i ' i i c l e a t t h e t i m e o t t h e a c c i d e n t , M e r e tuit for c a u s a t i o n 
f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e q u i s i t e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n be tween t h e 
l (si 1 1 \ . J \ a III i i i .i m i u l i 
I I  in accident in this case did not arise out of the use of a 
vehicle because Mi Coleman was intf using th*F vehicle as a 
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at the time ul the accident, Mi. Coleman wd.i lemcved trom the 
vehicle in time, space, activity and purpose when he fell. 
A d d i i 11 c.i I | 111 i, I f "iiiiji 11 Hi I 111 11 in 11 I I if n in in in i in mi 11 11 < i 11 .L i I i i in t h e 
time he fell He waii not engaged in any activity essential to or 
normally connected with the act of maintaining the vehicle when 
31 
he fell and caused the accident in question. 
The trial court properly ruled that the accident in question 
did not arise out of the use or maintenance of the insured 
vehicle. Summary judgment may be affirmed in favor of Viking. 
DATED this 9 day of May, 1996. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Viking Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin 
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APPENDIX " 1 " 
31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. 
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of 
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle 
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa) shall: 
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose 
name the policy was purchased, state that named in-
sured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium 
charged, the policy period, and the limits of liability; 
(b) (i) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropri-
ate reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage 
is granted, insure the person named in the policy, 
insure any other person using any named motor 
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the 
named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection 
(7), insure any person included in Subsection (lXc) 
against loss from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
or use of these motor vehicles within the United 
States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest an4 costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts 
not less than the minimum limits specified under 
Section 31A-22-304; or 
(ii) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person 
named as insured against loss from the liability 
imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of 
the insured^ use of any motor vehicle not owned by 
him, within the same territorial limits and with the 
same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under 
Subsection (lXbXi); and 
(c) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons 
related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adop-
tion, or guardianship who are residents of the named 
insured's household, including those who usually make 
their home in the same household but temporarily live 
elsewhere, to the same extent as the named insured. 
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302(lXa) may: 
(a) provide for the prorating of the insurance under 
that policy with other valid and collectible insurance; 
(b) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the re-
quired motor vehicle liability coverage; 
(c) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor 
vehicle business, limit the coverage afforded to a motor 
vehicle business or its officers, agents, or employees to the 
minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those 
instances when there is no other valid and collectible 
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other 
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent; and 
(d) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict cover-
age afforded to anyone other than the motor vehicle 
business or its officers, agents, or employees to the mini-
mum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those 
instances when there is no other valid and collectible 
insurance with at least those limits, whether the other 
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent 
(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any 
liability: 
(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title 
35; 
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an 
employee of the named insured, other than a domestic 
employee, while engaged in the employment of the in-
sured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance, or 
repair of a designated vehicle; or 
(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented 
to, bailed to, or transported by the insured. 
(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability 
coverage has the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, 
and if the settlement is made in good faith, the amount of the 
settlement is deductible from the limits of liability specified 
under Section 31A-22-304. 
(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
imposes on the insurer the duty to defend, in good faith, any 
person insured under the policy against any claim or suit 
seeking damages which would be payable under the policy. 
(6) (a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability cover-
age provides an insurer with the defense of lack of 
cooperation on the part of the insured, that defense is not 
effective against a third person making a claim against 
the insurer, unless there was collusion between the third 
person and the insured. 
(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective 
against the claimant, after payment, the insurer is sub-
rogated to the injured person's claim against the insured 
to the extent of the payment and is entitled to reimburse-
ment by the insured after the injured third person has 
been made whole with respect to the claim against the 
insured. 
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Sub-
section 31A-22-302U) may specifically exclude from coverage 
a person who is a resident of the named insured's household, 
including a person who usually makes his home in the same 
household but temporarily lives elsewhere, if each person 
excluded from coverage satisfies the owner's or operator's 
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, independently of 
the named insured's proof of owner's or operator's security. 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VIKING INSURANCE COMPANY : ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS 
OF WISCONSIN, : MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
ALLEN COLEMAN, RENE B. PETERSON, : 
TRANS COASTAL TRUCKING, and : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
: Civil No- 940908046CV 
Defendants. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment and the 
cross-motion of the defendants for summary judgment having come 
before this Court for hearing on August 1, 1995, with Terry M. 
Plant appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiff, Viking 
Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for 
and on behalf of the defendant, Trans Coastal Trucking, Taylor D. 
Carr appearing for and on behalf of the defendant, Allen Coleman, 
and Keith L. Barton appearing for and behalf of the defendant, Rene 
B. Peterson, the Court having reviewed memoranda filed by all 
parties, having further considered oral argument offered for and on 
behalf of all parties, and having otherwise reviewed the law and/or 
facts applicable to this case, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the motion for summary judgment of Viking 
Insurance Company of Wisconsin is granted and the cross-motion for 
summary judgment of the defendants is denied; 
2. That in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment the Court specifically finds that the accident in question 
did not reasonably arise out of the operation, uce or maintenance 
of an insured motor vehicle under the Viking Insurance Company 
policy and, as a result thereof, the Court finds that Viking 
Insurance Company owes no coverage whatsoever to its insured, Allen 
Coleman, or any of the remaining defendants who are potential 
claimants against Mr, Coleman, as a result of the accident in 
question. In making this ruling, the Court specifically finds that 
no coverage of any kind is due and owing any of the defendants 
under the policy, nor can the defendants make any claim for 
benefits under said policy as a result of the accident in question, 
which occurred on or about January 7, 1994, at or near State Road 
201 at its intersection with the 5600 West bridge overpass in West 
Valley City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. In addition, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court specifically finds that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final order and 
hereby specifically makes an entry of final judgment as to the 
Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 
Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin. 
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DATED this / ^ day of ft£rV0*/^- , 1995, 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
Taylor D. Carr 
Attorney for Defendant Coleman 
Keith L. Barton 
Attorney for Defendant Peterson 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Attorney for Defendant 
Trans Coastal Trucking 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
TMPtlrj/94-754.12 -3-
APPENDIX "3" 
Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin 
, POLICY DECLARATIONS 
UT0160 (4/93) 
INSURED 
NOTICE 
POLICY MyttBER 
44 0005256 
TRANSACTION TYPE 
NEW BUSINESS 
Date Printed 
11/29/93 
Agent Agent Code 
4400159 
ALLGRUNN-SWIM AGY INC 
3540 S 4000 W #430 
WEST VALLEY CIT , UT 84120-0000 
Agent Phone # 801-968-3541 
Insured 
COLEMAN, ALLEN K 
COLEMAN, CINDY 
3295 SOUTH 7615 WEST 
MAGNA, UT 84044 
TRANSACTION ££FECT!V£ &ATE 
11/15/93 
PQU CV £FF£Cf IVE &A?£ 
Policy Effective at Time of Application, 
Time Agent Bound Coverage, or 
1 1 / 1 5 / 9 3 12:01 a.m. Standard Time, 
whichever is later. 
mm ^rn^MW^ EXPIRATION OATS 
0 1 / 1 5 / 9 4 12:01 a.m. Standard Time 
PREMIUM FOR CURRENT TERM 
$106.00 
Original Policy Inception Date 
11/15/93 
BATHES INFORMATION 
Year 1983 Vehicle ID Number 1G3AE69R7DW351 369 1 MAO Symbol 
Make OLDS Vehicle Type STANDARD Garaging Zip 
Model OMEGA BROU Vehicle Use PERSONAL Territory 
Rated on Driver # 1 COLEMAN, ALLEN KENT Rating Points 
Rated Driver Birth Date 1 2 /1 2 /61 Rated Driver Gender M 
Rated Dr. Marital Status M 
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY 
UNINSURED MOTORIST 
BODILY INJURY 
$25,000 each person 
$50,000 each accident* 
$25,000 each person 
$50,000 each accident* 
00 
84044 
01 
006 
Multi-Car Credit N 
Safe Driver Credit N 
Defensive Dr. Cr. N 
Quarterly Discount N 
Preferred Cust. Cr. N 
Homeowner Credit N 
HPM^ 
22.00 
3.00 
UNINSURED MOTORIST 
PROPERTY DAMAGE 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
BODILY INJURY 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
REJECTED 
510,000 EACH PERSON 
>20,000 EACH ACCIDENT* 
SEE CE-59 FOR COVERAGES 
$15,000 each accident 
* Limit of Liability each accident or occurrence as indicated by the Insuring Agreement 
TOTAL MONTHLY PREMIUM 
3.00 
11.00 
14.00 
$53.00 
DRIVER INFORMATION 
DRIVER* 1 COLEMAN, ALLEN KENT 
Birth Date 12 /12 /61 
DRIVER* 2 COLEMAN, CINDY C 
Birth Date 0 7 / 0 4 / 7 1 
Driver Class 3 Financial Resp. N 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A 
D,i,., c » 7
 TR)JE fljtf flJRRECT COPY 
KUILIVY KJIWtS 
The following policy forms and endorsements apply to this policy: 
CE-26 (10/81) CE-59 (04/93) CE-61 (04/93) UT-CP (01/79) UT-CPA (04/93) 
ANY RENEWAL OF THIS POLICY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE RENEWAL PROVISION UNDER 
THE GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS. 
This policy is effective on the date shown on the face of these declarations. These declarations form a part of 
the policy and replace all previously issued declarations for this policy. If these declarations are 
accompanied by a new policy, this policy replaces any which may have been issued previously with the 
same policy number. 
THIS IS NOT A BILL - KEEP FOR YOUR RECORDS 
A!3 3WWYTITiTOI 
fc 
Viking Insurance Company 
of Wisconsin 
UTAH CAR POLICY 
INDEX PAGE 
A. DEFINITIONS 1 
B. INSURING AGREEMENT 2 
C. CARS WE INSURE 2 
D. WHAT TO DO WHEN AN 
ACCIDENT HAPPENS 2 
E. LIABILITY INSURANCE 2 
1. Our Promises To You 2 
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4. Those Not Protected 3 
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F. MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE 3 
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1. Our Promise To You 4 
2. Protection For Others 4 
3. Those Not Protected 4 
4. Uninsured Motor Vehicles 4 
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1. Our Promise To You 5 
2. Excluded Uses Of Cars 5 
3. Losses Covered 5 
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DEFINITIONS 
The terms that are defined below are in italics when they appear in the text of this policy. 
A car is a 4-wheel motor vehicle licensed for use on public roads. It includes any motor home that isn't used 
for business purposes and any utility trailer. 
A car accident is an unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or property damage and 
arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car or other motor vehicle. 
Damages means the cost of compensating those who suffer bodily injury or property damage from a car 
accident. It does not include amounts awarded as a punishment or deterrent. 
A motor vehicle is a land motor vehicle designed for use on public roads. It includes cars and trailers. It also 
includes any other land motor vehicle while used on public roads. 
Occupying means in, on or getting in or out of. 
A utility trailer is a trailer designed for use with a car. It includes a farm implement or farm wagon while towed 
on public roads by a car. It doesn't include a trailer used as an office, store, display or passenger trailer. 
You, your, yourself means the person named on the declarations page and that person's husband or wife if 
a resident of the same household. 
You, your, yourself also means a member of the family who is a resident of the household and who doesn't 
own a car or whose spouse doesn't own a car. 
UT-CP (1/79) -1- UT1200 (4/93) 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
Upon your payment of the premiums, we agree that this policy provides the various kinds of insurance you 
have selected as shown on the declarations page. The declarations page is a part of this policy. This insurance 
applies only to car accidents and losses which occur while this policy is in force. Subject to our consent, you 
may renew this policy. When we consent to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium in advance. 
You will not be protected if you do not pay the renewal premium before your policy expires. 
CARS WE INSURE 
We insure any car described on the declarations page and any car you replace it with. We'll also insure any 
additional car you acquire if we insure, under this insurance, all cars you own. But the replacement or addition 
is insured only if you notify us within 30 days of its date of purchase. 
We insure any utility trailer you own or are using except for collision and comprehensive insurance. For 
collision and comprehensive insurance, the utility trailer must be listed on the declarations page and a premium 
shown for it. We insure a substitute car when any car described on the declarations page, or any replacement 
or addition, can't be used because it's being serviced or repaired, or it's been stolen or destroyed. A car owned 
by you or a resident member of your family doesn't qualify as a substitute car. 
We insure other cars you use with the permission of the owner, but not for collision or comprehensive 
insurance. We don't insure other cars owned by, or furnished for the regular use of, you or resident members of 
your family. 
WHAT TO DO WHEN AN ACCIDENT HAPPENS 
When you're involved in a car accident, you or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible. 
The quickest way is to phone our nearest office. When you notify us, tell us how the accident happened and the 
extent of any injuries. If we need other information to investigate the accident, we'll ask you for it. We will require 
it in writing. 
If you're injured, we may ask that you be examined by a doctor we select. You must be examined when and 
as often as we may reasonably require. We may need authorization to obtain medical records and copies of 
other records. You must give us authorization upon each request. 
If the accident involves a hit-and-run driver, it must be reported within 24 hours to the police or Commissioner 
of Motor Vehicles. A statement under oath must be filed with us within 30 days after the accident has been 
reported. If you were occupying a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, you must make it available for our 
inspection, before it is repaired. 
If you have comprehensive or collision insurance, you must protect the car from any further damage. If you fail 
to do so, any further damage won't be recoverable under this policy. We'll pay any reasonable expenses 
incurred in protecting the car. We may require that you file with us a sworn proof of loss within 60 days after the 
accident. You may be required to show us your car or damaged property and submit to examination under oath. 
You must cooperate with us in our effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims against you and 
defend you. You must also send us, promptly, any legal papers served on you or your representative as a result 
of a car accident. Wyou fail to cooperate or fail to promptly send us such legal papers, we may have the right to 
refuse you any further protection for the accident or loss. If your car is stolen, you must report the theft to the 
police within 24 hours. 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Our Promises To You 
We promise to pay damages, within the limits of our policy, for bodily injury or property damage for which the 
law holds you responsible because of a car accident involving a car we insure. We also promise to pay 
additional benefits. 
Additional Benefits 
These benefits are in addition to our limit of liability for damages. We'll pay for the cost of investigating the car 
accident and arranging for the settlement of any claim against you. We'll also defend you, hire and pay a lawyer, 
and pay all defense costs if you're sued by someone for damages because of a car acc/denf-even if the 
accusations aren't true. However, we won't be obligated to pay for the cost of any further investigation or 
arrangement for settlement or to defend you further after we've paid our entire limit of liability for damages. If the 
person who sues you tries to tie up your property by an attachment, we'll arrange and pay for a bond to release 
the attachment. We do have to limit this, so you'll have to pay the cost of the additional amount of the bond if 
the bond required is more than the limits of liability available to you. 
Wyou lose a lawsuit that we're defending, we'll pay the court costs. If we decide to appeal, we'll also pay those 
court costs. We'll also pay interest on the full amount of the judgement even if the judgement is higher than the 
limit of liability. And we'll pay this interest from the day the judgement is entered until we've offered the other 
party the amount of the judgement up to the full limits of liability available under this insurance. 
We'll pay any reasonable travel expenses you might have for attending hearings or a trial at our request. We'll 
pay your expense for first aid to others at the scene of a car accident involving a car we insure. 
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Protection For Others 
Anyone using, with your permission, a car described on the declarations page, or any additional, replacement 
or substitute car, has the same rights and obligations that you have under this insurance. 
Any corporation you work for or any partnership in which you're a partner has the same rights and obligations 
that you have under this insurance if it owns or hires a car described on the declarations page. 
Anyone else who doesn't own or hire a car operated by you and who may be responsible for its use has the 
same rights and obligations that you have under this insurance. 
Those Not Protected 
Anyone protected at the time of the car accident by an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance contract 
isn't protected by this insurance. The reason for this is that by law such policies protect all persons involved in 
the car accident-regardless of who was at fault. 
Neither the United States of America nor any of its agencies is protected by this insurance. 
Anyone for whom the United States Government may be held responsible under the Federal Tort Claim Act 
isn't protected by this insurance. 
Excluded Uses Of Cars 
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure. 
We don't insure your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge. 
We don't insure any car you're driving while it's available for hire by the public. 
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or 
stunting contest or activity, or for the event itself. 
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles. 
However, we'll insure your use of a car in such business if you own the car and that car is insured under this 
policy. Also, if you're the owner or a partner in such business, we'll insure your partner's and employee's use of 
a car you own provided that car is insured under this policy. 
Bodily Injury Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers bodily injury, including loss of services, sickness, disease or death which results from 
the injury, caused by a car accident and suffered by any person. 
This insurance doesn't cover your employees if you are required to provide workers' compensation insurance 
and such insurance would apply to the injury. 
This insurance doesn't cover a fellow employee of anyone protected by this insurance, other than you, if the 
injury is suffered in the course of employment. 
Property Damage Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers property damage that results from a car accident. Property damage means any injury 
to or destruction of physical property, including the loss of use of that property. 
This insurance doesn't cover any property damage to any property you rent, own, have charge of or are 
transporting. 
Limits Of Liability 
The limits of liability shown on the declarations page are the maximum amounts we'll pay in damages for any 
one car accident. 
The limit for "each person" is the limit for all claims by all persons for damages from bodily injury to one person. 
The limit for "each occurrence" is the total limit for all claims for damages from bodily injury to two or more 
people in any one car accident. The limit for property damage is the limit for all claims for damages, direct or 
indirect, by all persons from damage to property in any one car accident. Even though more than one car is 
insured with us and separate premiums are charged for each car, or more than one person is protected under 
this insurance, the limits of liability won't be increased. When damages are payable on your behalf under more 
than one policy we've issued to you, we won't pay more than the highest limits in any one such policy. 
Financial Responsibility Laws 
If you're required to show proof of financial responsibility for the future because of car accidents, traffic 
violations or other state motor vehicle requirements, we'll certify this policy as proof. When we certify this policy 
as proof, all the terms and conditions of this insurance will be amended to comply with the requirements of such 
law. But the terms and conditions of this insurance won't be amended for any limits of liability in excess of the 
minimum limits required by such law. YOU MUST REIMBURSE US IF WE HAVE TO MAKE A PAYMENT THAT 
WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO MAKE IF THIS POLICY WERE NOT CERTIFIED AS PROOF. 
MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE 
Our Promises To You 
We promise to pay medical expenses for your bodily injury, sickness, disease or death suffered in a car 
accident while occupying a car or from having been struck by a motor vehicle. We'll pay the medical expenses 
incurred within one year from the date of the car accident, within the limits shown in the declarations. 
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Protection For Others 
Anyone occupying, with your permission, a car we insure has the same rights and obligations that you have 
under this insurance. 
Those Not Protected 
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge isn't protected by this insurance. 
Anyone occupying a car you're driving while it's available for hire by the public isn't protected by this 
insurance. 
Anyone occupying a car in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or stunting 
contest or activity, or for the event itself, isn't protected by this insurance. 
Anyone occupying or struck by a car owned by you or furnished for your regular use and not insured under 
this insurance isn't protected by this insurance. 
Anyone occupying a car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles 
isn't protected by this insurance. However, we'll protect you, your partner or employee if the car is owned by you 
and is insured under this insurance. We'll also protect occupants if the car owned by you and insured under this 
insurance is being used by you, your partner or employee. 
Anyone protected at the time of the car accident by an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance contract 
isn't protected by this insurance. The reason for this is that by law such policies protect all persons involved in 
the car accident-regardless of who was at fault. 
Medical Expenses Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers reasonable and necessary medical, surgical, chiropractic and dental treatment, profes-
sional nursing, hospital, x-ray, ambulance and funeral services and prosthetic devices. This insurance also 
covers reasonable and necessary treatment rendered in accordance with a legally recognized religious method 
of healing. 
This insurance doesn't cover that amount paid or payable under any health or accident insurance available. 
This insurance doesn't cover that amount payable or required to be provided under any workers' compensa-
tion, disability benefits law or similar law. 
This insurance doesn't cover medical expenses for injury caused by war. 
THIS INSURANCE DOESN'T COVER CARE WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR ITS MILITARY 
SERVICES ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE TO EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS, OR DEPENDENTS. 
Payment Of Benefits 
We may pay you, the person providing the medical services or the person responsible for payment of the 
medical expenses. 
When we pay your medical expenses, you or your legal representative must agree in writing to repay us out of 
any damages you recover under the liability or uninsured motorist insurance of this policy. 
Limits Of Medical Expense Insurance 
Regardless of the number of cars we insure under this policy, the limit of medical expense insurance is the 
amount shown on the declarations page for "each person". When medical expenses are payable under more 
than one policy issued by us, we won't pay more than the highest limit in any one such policy. 
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 
Our Promise To You 
We promise to pay the damages you're legally entitled to receive from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle because of bodily injury. We'll pay these damages for bodily injury you suffer in a car accident 
while occupying a car or, as a pedestrian, as a result of having been struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. 
Protection For Others 
Anyone occupying, with your permission, a car we insure has the same rights and obligations that you have 
under this insurance. 
Those Not Protected 
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired or rented to others for a charge isn't protected by this insurance. 
Anyone occupying a car you are driving while it's available for hire by the public isn't protected by this 
insurance. 
Anyone occupying a motor vehicle owned by you or furnished for your regular use and not insured under this 
insurance isn't protected by this insurance. 
Uninsured Motor Vehicles 
An uninsured motor vehicle is a motor vehicle for which there is no bodily injury policy or liability bond 
available at the time of the car accident with at least the minimum limits required by the financial responsibility 
law of the state in which your car is principally garaged. 
An uninsured motor vehicle also includes a motor vehicle which has insurance available at the time of the car 
accident but the company writing it is or becomes insolvent or denies coverage. 
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An uninsured motor vehicle u . hit-and-run motor vehicle that strikes yc or a car you are occupying, if 
neither the driver nor the owner can be identified. 
Excluded Uninsured Motor Vehicles 
A motor vehicle owned by you or furnished for your regular use isn't an uninsured motor vehicle. 
A motor vehicle that's owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial 
responsibility law, motor carrier law or any similar law isn't an uninsured motor vehicle. 
A motor vehicle owned by any governmental authority or agency isn't an uninsured motor vehicle. 
Bodily Injury Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers bodily injury, including loss of services, sickness, disease or death which results from 
the injury, caused by a car accident and suffered by you. This insurance doesn't cover bodily injury if, without 
our written consent, you settle or sue to a judgement a claim against anyone responsible for your injury. 
Payment Of Damages 
We may pay you, your legal representative or anyone authorized by law to receive payment. 
The amount of damages payable under this insurance will be reduced by the amount paid by or on behalf of 
anyone responsible for your injury. This includes any amount paid under the liability insurance of this policy and 
any amount paid or payable under any workers' compensation law, disability benefits law or any similar 
law-exclusive of any state non-occupational disability benefits law. 
Trust Agreement 
When we pay you damages under this insurance, you or your legal representative must agree in writing to 
repay us out of any damages recovered from anyone responsible for your injuries. You or your legal repre-
sentative must also agree in writing to hold in trust and preserve for us all rights of recovery. 
At our request, you must take any necessary action to recover the payments we've made under this insurance. 
You must do so in your own name and through a representative we select. Expenses of recovery will be repaid 
to us out of any damages recovered. 
Arbitration 
If we and you, or your legal representative, don't agree on your legal right to receive damages or the amount 
of damages, then upon the written request of either party, the disagreement will be settled by arbitration. 
Arbitration will take place in the county where you live. You'll select one arbitrator and we'll select another. The 
two selected arbitrators will then select a third. If the two arbitrators are unable to agree on a third arbitrator 
within 30 days, the judge of the court of record in the county of jurisdiction where arbitration is pending will 
appoint the third arbitrator. 
Local court rules governing procedure and evidence will apply unless the arbitrators agree on other rules. The 
decision in writing of any two arbitrators will be binding on you and us, subject to the terms of this insurance. 
Judgement on any award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. 
You'll pay the arbitrator that you choose and we'll pay the arbitrator we choose. The expense of the third 
arbitrator and all other expense of arbitration will be shared equally by you and us. 
Limits Of Uninsured Motorist Insurance 
The limit of uninsured motorist insurance shown on the declarations page for "each person" is the maximum 
we'll pay in damages for bodily injury to any one person. 
The maximum we'll pay in damages for bodily injury to two or more persons is the amount shown on the 
declarations page for "each accident". 
Even though we insure you under more than one policy, or more than one car is listed on the declarations 
page, and separate premiums are charged for each car or policy, these limits won't be increased. 
COLLISION INSURANCE 
Our Promise To You 
We promise to pay you for accidental damage to your car and its equipment when it's hit by or it hits another 
car, it hits another object or rolls over. We'll pay for the damage minus any applicable deductible. We'll waive 
the deductible if the collision is between a car insured under this insurance and another car insured by us. 
Excluded Uses Of Cars 
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure. 
We don't insure any car while it's available for hire by the public. 
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or 
stunting contest or activity, or used in the event itself. 
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles. 
However, we'll insure a car used in such business if the car is described on the declarations page, or is a 
replacement, additional or substitute car. 
Losses Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers all direct and accidental collision losses to cars we insure. 
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This insurance doesn't cover c jllision loss of more than one stereo tape, .ssette or cartridge. 
This insurance doesn't cover any loss due to war. 
This insurance doesn't cover any camper unit that's designed for mounting on a vehicle unless the unit has 
been reported to us. 
This insurance doesn't cover any equipment or accessories contained in motor homes, camper units or trailers 
unless they're built in and form a permanent part of the vehicle. In both cases a premium must be paid for this 
coverage. 
This insurance doesn't cover special equipment, parts and accessories unless you include them in the 
application, or tell us when you add them to the car, and pay a premium for them. The following are examples 
of special equipment, parts and accessories: (a) chrome, alloy, or magnesium wheels, (b) custom wide tread 
tires and racing slicks, (c) custom paint work, glass, or chroming, (d) tape record player and stereo radios, 
unless factory installed as original equipment, (e) two-way radios (including CB radios), and telephones or 
radio-telephones, (f) custom enclosures for pickup trucks, (g) custom interior work. 
This insurance doesn't cover any car you do not own unless it is listed in the declarations page. 
Payment Of Loss 
We may pay for the collision loss in cash or we may repair or replace the damaged property. We may take all 
or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value. 
We may settle any loss either with you or the owner of the property. 
Limits Of Payment 
The maximum limit of collision insurance for losses is the actual cost to repair or replace the damaged 
property. Payment won't exceed the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss. 
COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE 
Our Promise To You 
We promise to pay for direct and accidental loss of, or damage to, your car and its equipment-not caused by 
collision. We'll pay for the loss or damage minus any applicable deductible. 
Accidental glass breakage and loss or damage from missiles, falling objects, theft or animals is a comprehen-
sive loss. 
We also promise to pay additional benefits. 
Additional Benefits 
We'll pay you for transportation costs up to $10 per day to maximum of $300 if your car is stolen. We'll pay the 
costs that begin 72 hours after the theft has been reported to us and to the police. The payment ends when your 
car is recovered or we've paid or offered to pay the loss. 
We'll pay salvage charges for which you become legally liable because of transporting a car we insure. 
Excluded Uses Of Cars 
While we provide broad protection under this insurance, there are some situations we don't insure. 
We don't insure any car while it's available for hire by the public. 
We don't insure any car used in preparation for any prearranged or organized racing, speed, demolition or 
stunting contest or activity, or used in the event itself. 
We don't insure any car used in the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles. 
However, we'll insure a car used in such business if the car is described on the declarations page, or is a 
replacement, additional or substitute car. 
Losses Covered By This Insurance 
This insurance covers all direct and accidental comprehensive losses to cars we insure. 
This insurance doesn't cover loss which is due and confined to wear and tear or mechanical or electrical 
breakdown or failure, unless it results from a theft or other loss covered by this insurance. 
This insurance doesn't cover a loss due to conversion or embezzlement. 
This insurance doesn't cover a comprehensive loss of more than one stereo tape, cassette or cartridge. 
This insurance doesn't cover any loss due to war. 
This insurance doesn't cover any camper unit that's designed for mounting on a vehicle unless the unit has 
been reported to us. 
This insurance doesn't cover any equipment or accessories contained in motor homes, camper units or trailers 
unless they're built in and form a permanent part of the vehicle. In both cases a premium must be paid for this 
coverage. 
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This insurance doesn't cover .jecial equipment, parts and accessories ,nless you include them in the 
application, or tell us when you add them to the car, and pay a premium for them. The following are examples 
of special equipment, parts and accessories: (a) chrome, alloy, or magnesium wheels, (b) custom wide tread 
tires and racing slicks, (c) custom paint work, glass, or chroming, (d) tape record player and stereo radios, 
unless factory installed as original equipment, (e) two-way radios (including CB radios), and telephones or 
radio-telephones, (f) campers and custom enclosures for pickup trucks, (g) custom interior work. 
This insurance doesn't cover any cars you do not own unless it is a substitute car, or it is listed on the 
declarations page. 
Payment Of Loss 
We may pay for the loss in cash or we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen property. Before a loss is 
paid or the property is replaced, we may return any stolen property to you at our expense with payment for any 
damage. 
We may settle any loss either with you or the owner of the property. 
Limits Of Payment 
The maximum limit of comprehensive insurance for losses is the actual cost to repair or replace the damaged 
property. Payment won't exceed the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss. 
GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS 
Our Right To Recover From Others 
After we have made payment under the Liability, Medical Expense, Uninsured Motorist, Comprehensive or 
Collision insurance of this policy, we have the right to recover the payment from anyone who may be held 
responsible. You and anyone we protect must sign any papers and do whatever else is necessary to transfer this 
right to us. You and anyone we protect must do nothing to affect our rights. 
Transfer Of This Policy 
This policy can't be transferred to any person or organization without our written consent. However, if the 
person named on the declarations page dies, this policy will provide protection until the end of the policy period 
for the deceased's legal representative and those persons who were protected on the date of death. 
Changes In Your Policy 
We'll automatically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of this policy if the change doesn't 
require additional premium. 
The only other way this policy can be changed is by policy endorsement. Any necessary adjustment of 
premium will be made at that time. 
If, at the time of your application for insurance or the issuance of this policy, our agent misrepresents facts to 
us without your knowledge, we won't void this policy or deny you protection in the event of a loss or claim. 
Territory 
This policy applies only to car accidents and losses within the United States of America, its territories or 
possessions and Canada, or while the car is being transported between their ports. 
Cancellation During The Policy Period 
You may cancel this policy by mailing to us a written notice stating the future date you wish the cancellation to 
be effective. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent as soon as possible after the date of 
cancellation. The earned premium may be based on our short rate table. This means that we may keep premium 
for the days you were protected, plus a percentage charge to cover the expense of cancelling during the policy 
period. 
We won't cancel this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, creed, 
national origin, ancestry or occupation. If we cancel this policy, we must mail the notice of cancellation to you 
at least 10 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent 
as soon as possible after the cancellation date. The earned premium will be based on our pro rata table. This 
means that we'll keep premium for only those days that you were protected. 
If your state has special restrictions on our right to cancel, we will change our policy to meet these restrictions. 
In that case, you will find the rules on cancellation in an endorsement which will be included with your policy. 
If we cancel, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of 
notice as of the date we mail it. Delivery of written notice of cancellation by either you or us will be equivalent to 
mailing. 
Renewal Provision 
We won't refuse to renew this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, 
creed, national origin, ancestry or occupation. Subject to our consent, you may renew this policy. When we 
consent to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium in advance. We will mail you a notice telling 
you when your premium must be paid. Your policy will expire if we don't receive the required payment by the 
renewal date. 
If we decide not to renew your policy, we'll mail to you, at your address shown on the declarations page, written 
notice of non-renewal. The written notice will be mailed to you at least 20 days before the end of the policy term. 
If we decide not to renew your policy, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will 
constitute proof of notice as of the date we mail it. 
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Out-Of-State Insurance 
If this policy provides liability insurance and you are traveling in a state which requires non-residents to carry 
higher liability limits than are shown on the declaration page of your policy we'll automatically provide these 
higher limits. However, we won't provide any additional coverage under the No-Fault law or any other similar 
law of any other state. This insurance is excess only. 
Other Insurance 
Sometimes two or more insurance policies protect the same person or organization for a car accident. When 
this happens, damages or loss may be payable under each policy. Insurance companies try to avoid conflicts 
where this possibility exists by stating the basis on which their insurance applies. Where it isn't likely any other 
insurance will be involved, the insurance company usually makes its insurance primary. Primary insurance pays 
even if there is other insurance. Where it's likely that other insurance will apply, insurance companies make their 
insurance excess. Excess insurance protects you when primary insurance is exhausted or no primary insurance 
is available. 
This insurance is primary for any car described on the declaration page, or any additional or replacement car 
we insure. 
This insurance is excess for the use of any car not owned by you. 
Occasionally there is other primary insurance available when this insurance is primary; or there is other excess 
insurance available when this insurance is excess. When this happens the following rules apply: 
LIABILITY INSURANCE--lf the other insurance isn't issued by us, we'll pay only our share of any damages. Our 
share is determined by adding up the limits of this insurance and all other insurance that applies on trie same 
basis and finding the percentage of the total which our limits represent. 
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE-We'll pay only our share of any damages. Our share is determined by 
adding up the limits of this insurance and any other insurance that applies on the same basis and finding the 
percentage of the total which our limits represent. That percentage is applied to the amount of damages which 
doesn't exceed the highest limit of any one such policy. 
When this insurance is excess and all other insurance is primary, we'll pay damages up to the amount by 
which this insurance exceeds the limits of the primary insurance. 
COLLISION AND COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE-The amount of the loss in excess of any applicable 
deductible will be shared equally. 
Collision And Comprehensive Payments 
We will pay loss or damage due under this policy according to your interest and that of the lienholder. We may 
make separate payments according to those interests. 
We will pay the lienholder for a loss under the terms of this policy even though you have violated the terms of 
the policy by something you have done or failed to do. However, we will not pay for any loss caused by 
conversion, embezzlement or secretion by you or anyone acting on your behalf. We will not pay the lienholder 
more than the net balance of the loan. 
We will not notify the lienholder each time you renew this policy and we may cancel this policy according to its 
terms. We will protect the lienholder's interest for 10 days after we notify him that the policy has terminated, for 
any reason. 
If you fail to give proof of loss within the time allowed, the lienholder may protect his interest by filing a proof 
of loss within 30 days after that time. 
The lienholder must notify us of any known change of ownership or increase in the risk. If he does not, he will 
not be entitled to any payment under this endorsement. 
If we pay the lienholder under the terms of this endorsement for a loss not covered under the policy, we are 
subrogated to his rights against you. This will not affect the lienholder's right to recover the full amount of his 
claim. The lienholder must assign us his interest up to the amount of our payment and transfer to us all 
supporting documents. 
This policy is signed at Madison, Wisconsin, on behalf of Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin by our 
President and Secretary. It's countersigned on the declarations page by our authorized representative. 
Secretary 0 President 
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AME DATORY ENDORSEMENT - ( AH 
This endorsement modifies the "DEFINITIONS", "WHAT TO DO WHEN AN ACCIDENT HAPPENS", "UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST INSURANCE", and "GENERAL PROVISIONS" sections of your policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
The definition of motor vehicle is replaced by the following: 
Motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers 
and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farm tractors, tractor 
cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from 
overhead wires but not operated upon rails. 
The definition of you, your and yourself is replaced by the following: 
You, your, yourself means the person named on the declarations page and that person's husband or wife if 
a resident of the same household. 
You, your, yourself also means a member of the family who is a resident of the household and does not own 
a car or whose spouse does not own a car, or a member of the family who temporarily lives elsewhere and does 
not own a car. A "member of the family" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption and 
includes a ward or foster child. 
WHAT YOU M U S I HO WHEN \\ II II U X I D E N T HAPPENS 
This section is replaced with the following: 
When you're involved in a car accident, you or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible. 
The quickest way is to phone our nearest office. Notice to our authorized representative is considered notice to 
us. When you notify us, tell us how the accident happened and the extent of any injuries. If we need other 
information to investigate the accident we'll ask you for it. We will require it in writing. 
If you're injured, we may ask that you be examined by a doctor we select. You must be examined when and 
as often as we may reasonably require. We may need authorization to obtain medical records and copies of 
other records. You must give us authorization upon each request. 
If the accident involves a hit-and-run driver, it must be reported within 24 hours to the police or Commissioner 
of Motor Vehicles. A statement under oath must be filed with us within 30 days after the accident has been 
reported. If you were occupying a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, you must make it available for our 
inspection, before it is repaired. 
If you have comprehensive or collision insurance, you must protect the car from any further damage. If you 
fail to do so, any further damage won't be recoverable under this policy. We'll pay any reasonable expenses 
incurred in protecting the car. We may require that you file with us a sworn proof of loss within 60 days after the 
accident. You may be required to show us your car or damaged property and submit to examination under 
oath. 
You must cooperate with us in our effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims against you and 
defend you. You must also send us, promptly, any legal papers served on you or your representative as a result 
of a car accident. If you fail to cooperate or fail to promptly send us such legal papers, we may have the right 
to refuse you any further protection for the accident or loss. If your car is stolen, you must report the theft to the 
police within 24 hours. 
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 
The "Those Not Protected" is replaced by the following: 
Those Not Protected 
Anyone occupying your car while it's hired, rented or leased to others isn't protected by this insurance. 
Anyone occupying any car you are driving while hired, rented or leased by you which is not listed on the 
declarations page or is not a substitute car isn't protected by this insurance. 
The "Uninsured Motor Vehicles" section is replaced by the following: 
Uninsured Motor Vehicle 
An uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is not insured by a bodily injury liability policy or 
bond at the time of the car accident. This also includes a motor vehicle which is insured at the time of the car 
accident by a bodily injury liability policy or bond with limits below the minimum required by the financial 
responsibility law of the state in which your car is principally garaged. 
An uninsured motor vehicle also includes a motor vehicle which has insurance available at the time of the car 
accident but the company writing it is or becomes insolvent or denies coverage. 
An uninsured motor vehicle is a hit-and-run motor vehicle that strikes you, or a car you are occupying, if 
neither the driver nor the owner can be identified. 
If there is no physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the accident must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence from more than the covered person's testimony. 
NOTICE 
You may reject Uninsured Motorist Insurance by providing a written request. Such a rejection request is 
continuous until you request, in writing, Uninsured Motorist Insurance. 
GENERAL POLICY PROVISIONS 
The "Cancellation During the Policy Period" section is replaced by the following: 
Cancellation During The Policy Period 
You may cancel this policy by mailing to us a written notice stating the future date you wish the cancellation to 
be effective. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to your agent as soon as possible after the date of 
cancellation. The earned premium will be based on our short rate table. This means that we'll keep premium 
for days you were protected, plus a percentage charge to cover the expense of cancelling during the policy 
period. 
We won't cancel this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, creed, 
national origin, ancestry or occupation. 
If we cancel this policy within the first 60 days of coverage, or because you don't pay the premium when it's 
due, we must mail the notice of cancellation to you at least 10 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If we 
cancel this policy for any other reason after the first 60 days of coverage, we must mail the notice of cancellation 
to you at least 30 days before this policy is to be cancelled. If there is any refund in premium, we'll mail it to you 
as soon as possible after the cancellation date. The earned premium will be based on our pro rata table. This 
means that we'll keep premium for only those days that you were protected. 
After all or any part of this policy has been in effect for more than 60 days, or if this policy is a renewal, effective 
immediately, our right to cancel is limited. We may then cancel this policy only if you don't pay the premium 
when it is due, or if you obtained this policy through material misrepresentation, or a substantial change in risk, 
or substantial breach of contractual duties, conditions or warranties, or if your driver's license is suspended or 
revoked during the policy period. 
If we cancel, our mailing of notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of 
notice as of the date we mail it. Delivery of written notice of cancellation by either you or us will be equivalent to 
mailing. 
The "Renewal Provision" section is replaced by the following: 
Renewal Provision 
We won't refuse to renew this policy solely because of your age, sex, marital status, residence, race, color, 
creed, religion, national origin, ancestry or occupation. If we decide not to renew your policy, we will mail you 
written notice 30 days before the end of the policy period. If we decide not to renew your policy, our mailing of 
notice to your address shown on the declarations page will constitute proof of notice as of the date we mail it. 
When we offer to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium before the renewal date. We will mail 
you a notice telling you when your premium must be paid. Your policy will expire if we don't receive the required 
payment by the renewal date. 
The "Out-of-State Insurance" section is replaced by the following: 
If this policy provides liability insurance and you are traveling in a state which has compulsory motor vehicle 
insurance requirements for non-residents, we will automatically provide the required liability insurance. How-
ever, this insurance will be excess only. 
UT-CPA (9/93) 
The Medical Expense Section is 'aced with the following: 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE - UTAH 
We agree with you, subject to all of the provisions in this endorsement and to all of the provisions of the policy 
except as modified herein, as follows: 
SECTION I 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses, 
(b) work loss, 
(c) funeral expenses, and 
(d) survivor loss 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an accident involving the use of 
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply: 
(a) to bodily injury sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle which is owned by you 
or a family member and which is not your covered auto: 
(b) to bodily injury sustained by any person while operating your covered auto without your express 
or implied consent or while not in lawful possession of your covered auto. 
(c) to bodily injury sustained by any person, if such person's conduct contributed to his injury under 
either of the following circumstances: 
(1) causing injury to himself intentionally, or 
(2) while committing a felony; 
(d) to bodily injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while located 
for use as a residence or premises; 
(e) to bodily injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, 
or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; 
(f) to bodily injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of 
nuclear material. 
Definitions 
When used in reference to this coverage: 
Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom; 
Eligible injured person means: 
(a) you or any family member who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use of 
any motor vehicle; 
(b) any other person who sustains bodily injury caused by an accident while: 
(1) occupying your covered auto with your consent, or 
(2) occupying any other motor vehicle other than a public or livery conveyance, operated by you or 
a family member 
(3) a pedestrian if the accident involves the use of your covered auto\ 
Funeral expenses means funeral, burial or cremation expenses incurred; 
Insured means you, your spouse or a family member who resides in the same household as you including 
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using 
the described motor vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner; 
Your covered auto means a motor vehicle with respect to which 
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific premium is 
charged, and 
(b) the named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions of Title 41, Chapter 12a 
Utah Code Ann. 
Medical expenses means the reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental 
and rehabilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital and nursing services, 
and any non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method 
of healing; however, it does not include expenses in excess of those for a semi-private room, unless more 
intensive care is medically required; 
Motor vehicle means every se' opelled vehicle which is designed for use :>n a highway, including trailers 
and semitrailers designed for use w/ith such vehicles, except traction engines,, ^ ad rollers, farm tractors, tractor 
cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from 
overhead wires but not operated upon rails; 
Named insured or you means the person or organization in the declarations; 
Occupying means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate 
act of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle; 
Pedestrian means any person not occupying or riding upon a motor vehicle; 
Relative means a spouse or any other person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption (including a ward 
or foster child) who is a resident of the same household as the named insured, or who usually makes his home 
in the same household but temporarily lives elsewhere; 
Survivor loss means compensation on account of the death of the eligible injured person; 
Work loss means (a) loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the eligible injured person during his 
lifetime, from inability to work during a period commencing three days after the date of the bodily injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, provided that if such eligible injured person's 
inability to work shall so continue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of the bodily 
injury, this three day elimination period shall not be applicable; and (b) an allowance for services actually 
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred that, but for the bodily injury, the eligible injured person would have 
performed during his lifetime for his household commencing three days after the date of the bodily injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 consecutive days thereafter, provided that if such eligible injured person's 
inability to perform such services shall continue for in excess of two consecutive weeks after the date of the 
bodily injury, this three day elimination period shall not be applicable. 
Policy Period; Territory 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period and within the United States of 
America, its territories or possessions, or Canada. 
Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds applicable, claim made, or covered autos to 
which this coverage applies, our liability for personal injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury 
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor vehicle accident, is limited as follows: 
1. the maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed $3,000; 
2. the maximum amount payable for work loss is 
(a) eighty-five percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, not to exceed the total of 
$250 per week; For a maximum of 52 weeks after the loss. 
(b) $20 per day for inability to perform services for his household; For a maximum of 365 days after 
the loss. 
3. the maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall not exceed $1,500; 
4. the amount payable by us under the terms of this coverage shall be reduced by the amount paid, pay-
able, or required to be provided on account of such bodily injury 
(a) under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan; 
(b) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his or her being on active duty in the 
military services. 
Conditions 
A. Action Against Company. No action shall lie against us unless as a condition precedent thereto, there 
shall have been full compliance with all the terms of this coverage. 
B. Notice. In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the eligible in-
jured person, and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of 
the accident shall be given by or on behalf of each eligible injured person to us or any of our authorized 
agents as soon as practicable. If any eligible injured person, his legal representative or his survivors shall 
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily injury against a person or organization who is or may 
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and complaint or other process served in connection with 
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as practicable to us by such eligible person, his legal repre-
sentative, or his survivor. 
C. Medical Reports: Proof of Claim. As soon as practicable, the eligible injured person or someone on his 
behalf shall give to us written proof of claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of the nature 
and the extent of the injuries and treatment received and contemplated, and such other information as 
may assist us in determining the amount due and payable. The eligible injured person shall submit to 
physical and mental examinations by physicians selected by us when and as often as we may reasonably 
require. 
D. Subrogation. In the event of any payment under this coverage, we are subrogated to the rights of the per-
son to whom or for whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such payments, and such 
person must execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
E. Reimbursement and Trust / cement. In the event of any payment to person under this coverage: 
1. we shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that 
may result from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person against any person or organiza-
tion legally responsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made and we shall have 
a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to the person or organization caus-
ing such bodily injury, his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; 
2. such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of us all rights of recovery which he shall have against 
such other person or organization because of such bodily injury, 
3. such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such 
rights; 
4. such person shall execute and deliver to us instruments and papers as may be appropriate to secure 
the rights and obligations of such person and us established by this provision. 
F. Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance. The following provisions apply: 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or 
any other insurance. 
2. This insurance is primary only for bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person in an accident 
arising out of the use or operation of an insured motor vehicle. 
3. If an eligible injured person is entitled to similar benefits under more than one policy, the maximum 
amount recoverable under all policies combined shall not exceed the amount payable under the policy 
with the highest dollar limit. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits on the same basis. 
SECTION II 
Personal Injury Protection benefits paid or payable under this or any other auto insurance policy because of 
bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person shall be primary to any Medical Payments Coverage 
provided under this policy. 
SECTION III 
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in reliance upon the limitations on 
the right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of Title 31 A, Utah Code Ann. In the event a court of 
competent jurisdiction declares, or enters a judgment the effect of which is to render the provisions of such act 
invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, we shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the 
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at our option. 
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UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
We will pay damages, except punitive damages, which an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by 
an accident. The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. 
We will pay under this coverage only after limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or 
policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. 
Determination of whether an insured is legally entitled to recover damages or the amount of the damages shall 
be made by agreement between that person and us. If suit is brought to determine legal liability or amount of 
damages without our written consent, we are not bound by any resulting judgment. 
Insured as used in this Part means: 
1. You or any family member, including those who usually make their home in the same household but 
temporarily live elsewhere; 
2. Any other person occupying your car. 
3. Any person who is entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of the underinsured motor 
vehicle because of bodily injury to persons listed in (1) or (2). 
Underinsured motor vehicle means a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a 
liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to 
compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages. 
However underinsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle: 
1. The operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered under a liability policy or bond. 
2. Covered with lower liability limits than required by the Financial Responsibility Law of Utah Section 31A-
22-304. 
3. That is unidentifiable that left the scene of the accident proximately caused by the vehicle operator. 
4. That is insured by a liabil policy but the insuring company is declar 'nsolvent by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. 
5. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
6. Owned by any governmental unit or agency. 
7. Operated on rails or crawler treads. 
8. Which is a farm type tractor or equipment designed mainly for use off public roads while not on public 
roads. 
9. While located as a residence or premises. 
EXCLUSIONS 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. If that person or the legal representative settles the bodily injury claim without our consent. 
2. While occupying your car when it is being used to carry persons or property for a fee. This exclusion 
does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool. 
3. Using a vehicle without your permission or not within the scope of your permission. 
4. While occupying, operating, or maintaining any vehicle not licensed for use on public roads. 
5. While "occupying" or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any "family member" which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with this 
vehicle. 
6. While occupying, operating, or maintaining a motorcycle. 
B. We will not pay for exemplary or punitive damages. 
C. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any worker's 
or workmen's compensation law. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
Regardless of the number of covered cars, policies of insurance with our company or others, claims made or 
vehicles involved in the accident, our limit of liability is as follows: 
1. The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any 
once accident is the limit shown in the Declarations for "each person." 
2. Subject to the limit for "each person," the most we will pay for all damages resulting for bodily injury 
caused by any one accident is the limit shown in the Declarations for "each accident." 
3. The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an in-
sured person for any one accident. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be excess of: 
1. all sums paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be 
legally responsible. This includes all sums paid under the Liability Coverage of this policy, and 
2. all sums paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any worker's or workmen's compensation, 
disability benefits law. 
Any payment under this coverage to or for a covered person will reduce any amount that person is entitled to 
recover under the Liability Coverage of this policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If you are injured while occupying your car, you may not elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage 
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which you are covered unless coverage is not 
available under this policy. 
If you are injured as a pedestrian or while occupying a vehicle other than your car, you may elect the policy 
under which you collect underinsured motorist benefits. 
TRUST AGREEMENT/SUBROGATION 
If we pay you for loss under this coverage: 
1. We are entitled to recover from you an amount equal to such payment if there is a legal settlement 
made on your behalf against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury. 
2. You must hold in trust for us all rights which you have to recover money from any person or organiza-
tion legally responsible for bodily injury. 
3. You must do everything proper to secure our rights and do nothing to prejudice these rights. 
4. If we ask you in writing, you shall take the necessary or appropriate action, through a representative 
designated by us, to recover payment as damages from the responsible person or organization. If 
there is a recovery, then we shall be reimbursed out of the recovery for expenses, costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in connection with this recovery. 
5. You must execute and de' to us any legal instruments or papers nc sary to secure the rights and 
obligations of you and us oo established here. 
NOTICE 
You may reject Underinsured Motorist Insurance by providing a written request. Such a rejection request is 
continuous until you request, in writing, Underinsured Motorist Insurance. 
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PROPERTY DAMAGE UNINSURED MOTORIST 
COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT - UTAH 
In return for payment of premium for this coverage and subject to all the terms of the policy that apply, we agree 
with you as follows: 
We will pay compensatory damages which you are legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
uninsured motor vehicle because of property damage caused by an accident. The owner's or operator's liability 
for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. Any 
judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought without our consent is not binding on us. 
Your covered auto means a motor vehicle with respect to which 
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy applies and for which a specific premium is 
charged, and 
(b) the named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions of Title 41, Chapter 12a 
Utah Code Ann. 
Property damage as used in this endorsement means injury to or destruction of your covered auto. However, 
property damage does not include loss of use of your covered auto. 
Uninsured motor vehicle as used in this endorsement means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type, that 
hits your covered auto and whose owner, operator or license number can be identified. 
A. To which no liability bond or policy affording coverage for property damage applies at the time of the acci-
dent; or 
B. To which a liability bond or policy affording coverage for property damage applies at the time of the acci-
dent but the bonding or insuring company: 
(a) denies coverage; or 
(b) becomes insolvent; or 
(c) becomes voluntarily or involuntarily bankrupt; or 
(d) is placed in receivership. 
However, uninsured motor vehicle does not include any vehicle or equipment: 
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law, except a self-insurer 
which is or becomes insolvent. 
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency. 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads. 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on public roads. 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises. 
EXCLUSIONS 
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage for property damage. 
1. To any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under 
this policy. This includes a trailer of any type used with that vehicle. 
2. If you or your legal representative settles the property damage claim without our consent. 
3. When your covered auto is being used as a public or livery conveyance. This exclusion does not apply 
to a share-the-expense car pool. 
4. For the first $250 of the amount of property damage to each of your covered autos as the result of an 
accident. 
5. When your covered auto is being used by a person without a reasonable belief that that person is en-
titled to do so. 
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer of property. 
C. We do not provide Property Damage Uninsured Motorists Coverage for punitive or exemplary damages. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The limit of liability for this coverage is $3,500.00. It is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting 
from any one accident. Subject to this maximum, our limit of liability will be the lessor of: 
1. The actual cash value of the damaged property; or 
2. The amount necessary to repair or replace the property: 
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. Claims made; 
2. Vehicles we insure or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
3. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
An adjustment for depreciation and physical condition will be made in determining actual cash value at the 
time of loss. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid because of 
the property damage: 
1. By or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. 
2. Under any similar coverage under any other policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
Any coverage provided by this Endorsement is excess to any other insurance covering property damage to 
your covered auto. 
ARBITRATION 
This provision does not apply if a small claims court having jurisdiction resolves the matter or matters upon 
which the parties do not agree. 
A. If we and an insured do not agree: 
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement; or 
2. As to the amount of damages; 
then the matter may be arbitrated. However, both parties must agree to arbitration and to be bound by the 
results of that arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. 
If they cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having 
jurisdiction. 
B. Each party will: 
1. Pay the expenses it incurs, and 
2. Bear the expense of the third arbitrator equally. 
C. Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in either of the following, at the election of 
the insured: 
1. The county and state where the insured resides; or 
2. The county and state where the insured's cause of action against the operator or owner of the unin-
sured motor vehicle arose. 
Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will 
be binding. 
ADDITIONAL DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS 
A person seeking Property Damage Uninsured Motorist Coverage, or someone on that person's behalf, must 
also: 
1. Report the accident within 10 days to us or our agent. 
2. Promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit is brought. 
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